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Abstract
This paper analyzes the e¤ects of mixed public-private R&D in-
centives and empirically tests whether patents that were publicly spon-
sored are more "important" than non-subsidized ones. Blending patents
and public subsidies will allow the funding agency to subsidize inven-
tions that would otherwise not elicit investment because the private
incentive will not fully cover the cost of the invention. Thus, the pol-
icy maker will only subsidize inventions that have a high social value.
The empirical analysis shows that subsidized inventions result in more
"important" patents, as measured by the number of forward citations.
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1 Introduction
Technological change and innovation have long been understood to be a key
driver of economic growth. It is an explicit policy in most of the OECD
countries to promote innovation in order to achieve sustainable economic
growth. There is a vast literature that relates Research and Development
(R&D) to market failures, coming from the fact that "ideas" or "knowledge"
underlying the R&D process are by nature "non-excludable" and "non-rival".
Thus, under competitive pricing, an innovator will not invest in his/her idea
if the market price does not cover the cost of innovating. The main challenge,
from a policy point of view, is then to strike a balance between giving the right
incentive to innovate and allowing subsequent di¤usion of the innovation
Two possibilities to overcome the public good propriety of innovation
are intellectual property rights (for example patents) and government/public
subsidies. A patent creates a temporary monopoly for the innovator, by
preventing any other entity to use or sell the innovation whereas the gov-
ernmental subsidy covers part of the cost of the innovation. However, both
policies have defects: a patent creates a monopoly distortion which implies
a "deadweight loss" for society and public funding of R&D implies nancing
the subsidy with tax revenues. There is a vast literature on the optimal de-
sign of the patent system, starting with Nordhaus (1969) or on patent races
initiated by Reinganum (1983, 1985). There is also a burgeoning literature
that tries to assess the impact of public subsidies on private R&D, see for
example the surveys by David et al. (2000) and Klette et al. (2000). The
traditional way to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of public subsidies in the eco-
nomic literature is to relate the receipt of a public R&D grant on private
R&D spendings at the rm level. A majority of studies nds a complemen-
tary relationship between these two measures, that is, they usually reject full
"crowding-out". For example, Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) nd a signicant
e¤ect of publicly supported R&D on private R&D incurred by German rms,
while Lach (2002) nds a positive e¤ect for small rms and an insignicant
one in his full sample. However, some studies nd the opposite e¤ect. For
example, Wallsten (2000) nds a substitutive e¤ect of R&D subsidies from
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the SBIR program in the US and Gonzàlez et al. (2005) using Spanish data
conclude that publicly sponsored R&D projects would be carried out even
without the subsidy, although this would reduce their scope.
However, patent and subsidy policies are generally treated separately in
the economic literature and the literature analyzing the e¤ects of blending
public and private R&D incentives is meager. From a theoretical point of
view, Scotchmer (2004, Chapter 5) shows that a public-private R&D partner-
ship with mandatory matching funds will allow a public sponsor to subsidize
project that would not be carried out otherwise. Romano (1989, 1991) shows
the optimal patent design and R&D policy in a model in which both patents
and public funding coexist.
The 1980 Stevenson-Wydler and Bayh-Dole acts in the US encouraged
universities and private entities to patent the outcome of publicly funded
research which created a debate among economists on the "quality" of uni-
versity patents after this policy change (see for example Henderson et al.
1998 and Sampat et al., 2003). However, the blending of patents and pub-
lic funding goes beyond universities (see Scotchmer, 2004 and Eisenberg,
1996) and even large businesses can apply for patents on inventions partly
nanced with public funds. As pointed out by Scotchmer (2004) and Eisen-
berg (1996), blending patents and public funds is a counterintuitive policy,
since it requires the users to pay twice for the same innovation, rst through
taxes to nance the subsidy and then through higher monopoly prices.
The aim of this paper is to conduct an empirical test showing whether
patents that were publicly sponsored are more "important" than non-subsidized
ones. In other words, instead of testing the crowding-out e¤ect, I analyze
whether public subsidies create additional social value. At this end, I use the
result of a recent survey of inventors in Denmark that I merged with patent
citations data. It is to my knowledge the rst attempt to assess the e¤ec-
tiveness of R&D subsidies on the outcome for which the project was initially
funded.
The main results of the paper is that subsidized inventions result in more
"important" patents, as measured by the number of forward citations.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the theoretical
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background. Section 3 describes the data and provides the empirical results,
and Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
Scotchmer (2004) and Romano (1989, 1991) have both developed models
in which patent policy and subsidies can be blended. They show that the
interplay between both policies will allow the funding agency to subsidize
inventions that would otherwise not elicit investment because the private
incentive (i.e. the patent) will not fully cover the cost of the invention. Since
the empirical test relies on patented inventions only, it is worth sketching the
underlying incentive mechanism and how this a¤ects the empirical results.
Suppose a rm has an "idea" which requires R&D expenditures amount-
ing to x and therefore maximizes an objective function over the lifetime T of
the patent. Now suppose that private R&D x is not su¢ cient to cover the
cost of the invention. If the cost of the invention is x+S;We will assume that
the rm has the possibility to apply for a subsidy amounting to S > 0 from
a policy maker.
In this model, public funding of R&D can be combined with patents.
However, combining these policies comes at a cost for society. First, the
patent creates a deadweight loss through proprietary pricing, by excluding
consumers from buying the good, even though their willingness to pay exceeds
the marginal cost. Second, there are likely to be excess social costs associated
with the public funding of R&D resulting from raising tax revenues to nance
the subsidy. Following Romano (1989, 1991), I assume that each monetary
unit of subsidy has a social cost of 1 + 
, with 0  
 < +1.
The policy-maker seeks to maximize the following social welfare function:
Vs =
1  e rT
r
ms +
e rT
r
s   x  (1 + 
)S (1)
where ms denotes the social return ow from the discovery over the du-
ration of the patent. ms is composed of the increase in producer surplus and
of the consumer surplus. Finally assuming free entry after the patent has
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expired, s denotes the social return ow of the invention after the date T .
Thus   s   ms is the deadweight loss associated to proprietary pricing.
Let (T )  1 e rT
r
for notational convenience, then (2) can be rewritten as:
Vs =
s
r
  (T )  x  (1 + 
)S (2)
Assuming that social value lasts forever, the objective of the policy-maker
will be to invest in those ideas for which the discounted social value (s=r)
is greater than the social cost comprising the deadweight loss over the dis-
counted length of patent protection ((T )), the public and private R&D
expenses (x) and the social cost of the subsidy (1 + 
)S. As pointed out by
Scotchmer (2004), the policy maker especially wants to avoid subsidizing low
value inventions
The equilibrium discussed above requires that there is no asymmetric
information, i.e. that the private and social value of the invention are known
to both the rm and the sponsor ex-ante. In most of the cases, however,
the rm is repository of the best information about the private value of the
invention. If the social cost exceeds the sum of private and public spendings
(which is likely to be the case in the model outlined above), Scotchmer (2004)
suggests the rm commits to pay the di¤erence, whereas Romanos (1989,
1991) analysis implies that the policy-maker can increase monitoring of R&D
outlays, which would result in an increase of the social cost through 
. In
both cases this implies that the social value of the invention is known to
both parties at least ex-post. The aim of the next section is to test whether
subsidized inventions that were patented are indeed more "important" than
non-subsidized patented inventions. The focus is therefore on specic type
of research project, that received a subsidy and were subsequently patented.
However, the aim in this paper is not to test whether there is a crowding-
out e¤ect, i.e., whether rm substitute their own R&D with the subsidy or
whether public agencies fund projects that would have been carried out even
without the subsidy because the private incentive (i.e. the patent) would
have covered the cost of R&D. Instead, the goal is to undertake the more
modest task of estimating the impact of public subsidies on social welfare at
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the patent level.
The remainder of the paper focuses on the implementation of an empirical
test for the e¤ectiveness of public support to patented inventions. Before
describing the results, I rst present the dataset employed in the empirical
analysis and then outline the methodology and the identication strategy.
3 Data and variables
The data was compiled from two sources. First, I used the results of the
so-called "PatVal" survey for Denmark, that contains information on 495
patents granted by the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO), with priority dates
between 1993 and 1997. The PatVal project is a European-wide survey of
inventors, which primary aim was to assess the economic value of European
patents, by asking questions related to the personal characteristics of one of
the inventors listed in the selected patents. However, the survey also asked
questions related to the invention process more generally, including questions
on the nancing of the research that lead to the patent. This enables to
distinguish between patents that received a R&D subsidy from those that
did not. A summary of the key ndings of the Danish PatVal survey can be
found in Kaiser (2006). Giuri et al. (2007) provide a summary of the PatVal
survey for six other European countries.1
The second source of data is the EPO/OECD patent citations database,
that comprises all citations made to EPO patents in the period 1978-2006
(see Harho¤ et al., 2005 and Webb et al, 2005).
I use the number of forward citations to the focal patent as the relevant
output measure since this indicator can e¤ectively play the role of proxy for
the "importance" or "quality" of a patent (see Trajtenberg, 1990, Hender-
son et al., 1998, Harho¤ et al.,1999, Trajtenberg, 2001 or Hall et al., 2004).
Trajtenberg (1990) shows that forward patent citations are indeed highly
correlated with the social value of the underlying inventions in the computed
tomography industry, while Albert et al. (1991) nd a strong association
1France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
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between citation counts and knowledgeable peer opinion as to the technical
importance of the patents. Ja¤e et al. (2000) further validate this indicator
by nding a signicant correlation between the number of forward citations
to a given patent and the economic and technological "importance" of the in-
vention (as perceived by the inventors). Since a policy maker should be inter-
ested in supporting "important" inventions as shown in the previous Section,
one can expect publicly supported patents to receive more citations. Con-
trary to the well-known "NBER Patent Database", the "EPO/OECD patent
citations database" does not contain any information on "self-citations" (i.e.
the cited and citing patents are owned by the same entity). However, I would
not expect any signicant changes in the results from excluding self-citations
for two reasons. First, Sapsalis and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007)
found that removing self-citations in their sample of Belgian universities does
neither a¤ect the magnitude, nor the signicance of the variables2. Second,
unlike at the USPTO, applicants at the EPO do not have the "duty of can-
dor", which means that there is no legal requirement to disclose prior art.
The so-called "search report" that contains all citations made in a patent
application is carried out by the examiner at the EPO. Simple descriptive
statistics show that more than 95% of the citations in EPO patents are added
by the examiner. In contrast, USPTO applicants have to provide a full list of
prior art, including their own work which they know best. This suggests that
the "self-bias" in EPO patent applications is presumably very low and would
carry a weak informational content. Moreover, the fact that the allocation of
citations follows a standardized procedure at the EPO is likely to reduce the
noise contained in the forward citations as a measure of the "importance" of
patents.
The main explanatory variable is a dummy indicating whether the appli-
cant received any sort of public support to undertake the invention. Unfor-
tunately, I am not able to distinguish between the di¤erent potential sources
of public subsidy. However, as shown by Jespersen and Olsen (2007), almost
all R&D subsidies in Denmark stem from the Danish Ministry of Science,
2This is, to my knowledge, the only analysis that controls for self-citations in EPO
data.
7
Technology and Innovation.
Following the literature on patent "quality" using forward citations as
a dependent variable, intrisic attributes of the patent and the underlying
technology need to be controlled for. Citation measures might be inu-
enced by variations in citation practices across time and technology areas.
In addition, citations counts are usually also inuenced by the truncation
e¤ect, since later patents have less time to garner citations than earlier ones.
Therefore it is important to control for both time and technology e¤ects
(see for example Henderson et al., 1998). For these reasons, I include dum-
mies for di¤erent application years and six technology dummies using the
so called OST-INPI-FISI classication, provided by the O¢ ce des Sciences
et Techniques(OST), the French Patent O¢ ce (INPI) and the Fraunhofer
ISI Institute, which is based on a concordance with the International Patent
Classication (IPC) assignments.
Forward citations are subject to unobserved heterogeneity (Marco, 2007).
Building on the baseline specication outlined above, I also whish to control
for potential heterogeneity arising from the identity of the patent owner, the
competitive environment and the invention process. This aspect has been
largely neglected in the prior literature (see Cassiman et al., 2008 for an
exception). Given that the analysis is conned at the patent level, including
applicant and inventor specic variables is not straightforward, notably in
the case of multiple ownership of the patent. However, the PatVal survey
contains two interesting candidates to be included in the analysis.
In order to capture a patents science linkage, I will include a dummy
indicating whether the surveyed inventors claimed that they used universities,
public research institutes or scientic publications to carry out the research
leading to the patent (science linkage). For example, Nagaoka (2008) shows
that rms that cite scientic literature in their (U.S.) patents also receive,
on average, more citations. Taking the question from the survey enables to
have a more direct measure of an inventions science linkage.
The second additional variable included in the analysis (small rm) is a
dummy indicating whether (one of) the applicant(s) is a rm with less than
100 employees. First, public R&D policies tend to o¤er a favorable treatment
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to "small rms"3. Second, rm size might a¤ect the "quality" of the inven-
tion, but the sign of this e¤ect is not obvious. On the one hand, small rms
might su¤er from deciencies in economies of scope and/or scale compared to
larger corporations and on the other hand they may produce innovations of
higher "quality" because they have a reduced bureaucratic burden in compar-
ison to large companies (Acs and Audretsch, 1987; Cassiman and Veugelers,
2006).
Finally, to control for regional-specic sources of heterogeneity, I also in-
clude a set of ten dummies that indicate in which Danish region the invention
took place. The literature shows that knowledge spillovers tend to be local-
ized (Henderson et al., 1998). These dummies will control for the presence of
innovation clusters and any regional-specic characteristics more generally.
In addition, the data was cleaned for missing observations and inconsis-
tencies. Table 1 shows that 11% of the rms received a public subsidy to
carry out the research leading to the patented invention.
4 R&D subsidies and innovative performance:
the selection issue
Regressing forward citations or more generally any measure of research out-
put on the receipt of a public grant is not unproblematic. The selection
problem that arises in attempting to assess the impact of a public program
is well known in the economic literature (Heckman et al., 1998; Klette et al.,
2000; Hall et al., 2000 or Ja¤e, 2002). In fact, variables that are unobserv-
able by the econometrician might be correlated with the receipt of a public
subsidy. These variables could be the budget submitted to the agency, the
agencys personal knowledge of the applicants or the quality of the research
project proposed (Ja¤e, 2002). In addition all the components of the so-
cial cost of a patented invention, as described in the theory background in
Section 2, are also unobservable That is why I use an instrumental variable
3For example the "Small Business Act" or the "Small Business Innovation Research"
(SBIR) program in the U.S. and the "Young Innovative Companies" status in some Eu-
ropean countries.
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(IV) approach in this paper. Technically, there is no special consideration
in estimating a model by IVs when the endogenous explanatory variable is
a dummy (Wooldridge, 2002). Actually, estimating the rst stage equation
with a linear probability model will yield consistent estimates (if the instru-
ments are valid), whether or not the rst stage equation is linear (Angrist,
2001).
The candidate source of exogenous variation in the R&D subsidy equa-
tion is a dummy indicating whether at least one of the inventors listed in
the application was employed at a university or a public research institute
at the time of the invention (academic inventor). There is considerable evi-
dence that European universities do not claim ownership of the intellectual
property right even when one of their researchers took part in the invention
process (see for example Guena and Nesta., 2006). In fact, the owners of
those patents are most of the time rms.4 It is an explicit policy of the Dan-
ish government (and most of the other European governments) to strengthen
public-private collaborations,5 thus, applications involving academic inven-
tors are systematically favored by the funding agencies. However, "academic
consulting" might have an e¤ect on the quality of the patented invention, but
the sign of this e¤ect is uncertain. On the one hand, academic involvement in
patents owned by corporations may lower their incentives to provide a high
quality contribution (Aghion and Tirole, 1994) and on the other hand, a rm
can benet from a researchers expertise in science intensive areas (Lacetera,
2007). However, as mentioned above, the dummy indicating whether the
surveyed inventors claimed that they used scientic source of knowledge to
carry out the research leading to the patent is included in both stages of the
model. Once this scientic linkage is controlled for, there is no obvious reason
to think that the academic inventor dummy still a¤ects the unobservables in
the equation of interest.
4There was actually no observation with a university-owned patent in the survey used
in this paper. In Schneider (2007), I show that there were only eight patents applied for
by Danish universities or public institutions at the EPO in the period 1978-1998.
5The Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (that funds almost all
R&D subsidies in Denmark) states that "Collaboration between public-sector research
institutions and private-sector companies" is one important criteria for allocating R&D
subsidies. See http://fi.dk
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variables N Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Number of Forward citations 495 2.159 2.913 0 23
Subsidy 494 10.93% 0.312 0 1
Science linkage 410 69.02% 0.463 0 1
Small firm (< 100 employees) 495 18.18% 0.386 0 1
Academic inventor 486 4.94% 0.216 0 1
City with less than 10,000 inhabitants 478 16.52% 0.371 0 1
Rural area 478 10.66% 0.309 0 1
Application years
1993 495 2.02% 0.143 0 1
1994 495 25.65% 0.435 0 1
1995 495 19.79% 0.401 0 1
1996 495 18.98% 0.396 0 1
1997 495 22.83% 0.418 0 1
1998 495 10.70% 0.306 0 1
Technology classes
Electricity-electronics 495 8.08% 0.274 0 1
Instruments 495 11.31% 0.311 0 1
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals 495 24.64% 0.432 0 1
Process engeneering 495 18.99% 0.394 0 1
Mechanical engeneering 495 26.66% 0.442 0 1
Others 495 10.30% 0.303 0 1
5 Results
The regression results are presented in Table 2. The specication follows
closely a well established literature that analyzes the structure of patent ci-
tations, see for example Henderson et al., (1998) or Harho¤ et al., (1999).
The reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedastisity and corrected
for potential dependence of observations by respondent. Table 2 reports the
baseline results of OLS regressions using the log of (one plus) the number
of forward citations as the dependent variable. The subsidy dummy has a
positive and signicant e¤ect (at the 5% level) on the number of forward ci-
tations. According to these estimates, patents that received a public subsidy
are more important than others by about 20%. Columns (2) and (3) repeat
the regression by sequentially introducing two additional controls. The re-
sults show that there is a slight negative e¤ect of small rms, and that the
science linkage of the invention tends to improve the quality of patents.
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Table 2: Estimation results
Coef. s.d. Coef. s.d. Coef. s.d.
Subsidy 0.192* 0.102 0.199** 0.102 0.219* 0.119
Small firm -0.164* 0.089 -0.091 0.099
Science linkage 0.172** 0.081
Technology classes
Application years
Regional dummies
Constant 0.435 0.281 0.635*** 0.245 0.635*** 0.239
Number of observations
R squared
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
included included included
included included included
included included included
0.107 0.1200.114
486 486 477
As argued in the previous Section, OLS can only establish a correlation
between the grant dummy and the outcome variable, but in this case it cannot
determine a causal e¤ect of R&D grants on the "quality" of patents.
This is why Table 3 repeats the regressions instrumenting for the subsidy
dummy with the academic inventor variable presented above. The rst stage
regressions are reported at the bottom of the Table. The instrument is highly
signicant and explains about 15% of the variation of the subsidy dummy.
The instrumented subsidy dummy gains in signicance compared to OLS
and the measured coe¢ cients and standard errors are of higher magnitude
than in the OLS regressions resulting in wider condence intervals.
Regarding the statistical validity of the instrument, the Kleibergen-Paap
underidentication LM and Wald tests reject their null hypotheses, suggest-
ing that the instrument is adequate to identify the equation. In addition, the
academic dummy passes a standard F-test of identifying restriction.
With respect to the control variables, the results show that patents that
involve a small rm receive on average less citations once the endogenous na-
ture of the subsidy dummy is controlled for. This result goes in the direction
of the Schumpeterian argument that large rms might be more capable of
producing high quality technologies due to scale economies and advantages
in accessing up-front knowledge in the market. However, no signicant e¤ect
is found for small rms on the propensity to be granted a R&D subsidy.
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The science linkage of the invention still appears to be relevant to explain
patent quality once the subsidy dummy is instrumented for, which conrms
the presumption that breakthrough innovations have a higher technological
impact.
Table 3: Regression results (2)
Coef. s.d. Coef. s.d. Coef. s.d.
Subsidy 0.843*** 0.287 0.837*** 0.302 0.865*** 0.318
Small firm -0.193** 0.090 -0.096 0.100
Science linkage 0.137* 0.084
Technology classes
Application years
Regional dummies
Constant 0.659*** 0.245 0.697*** 0.244 0.719*** 0.275
First stage:
Small firm 0.037 0.044 0.002 0.046
Science linkage 0.026 0.031
Technology classes
Application years
Regional dummies
Excluded Instruments for subsidy:
Academic inventor 0.542*** 0.095 0.543*** 0.096 0.564*** 0.110
Constant 0.036 0.061 0.029 0.059 -0.030 0.061
Number of observations
Diagnostic tests and statistics
R-squared (first stage)
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments
F-test of excluded instrument
Underidentification tests:
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic
(1) (2) (3)
IV IV IV
included
477 477 394
included included included
included
included included
included included
included
included
included
included
included
included
included included included
16.34***
30.82***
0.306
0.165
26.18***
13.03***
25.45***
0.302
0.150
32.40***
16.47***
31.46***
0.303
0.151
31.88***
As a robustness check, Table 4 repeats the regression using the dummy
endogenous variable IV regression model following Wooldridge (2002). This
estimator is more e¢ cient than the traditional 2SLS model and has several
robustness properties, but requires to make stronger assumptions. The es-
timation of this model consists of two steps: (i) estimate a binary response
model (probit or logit) of the dummy endogenous subsidy variable on all
exogenous variables (including the instruments) and obtain the tted prob-
abilities, say
f
g. (ii) Estimate the outcome equation by IVs using
f
g as an
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instrument. The subsidy coe¢ cient estimate from this procedure using t-
ted values from a probit estimation as an IV as well as the standard errors
are almost identical to the traditional IV estimates.
Table 4: Estimation results (3)
Coef. s.d. Coef. s.d. Coef. s.d.
Subsidy 0.840*** 0.280 0.881*** 0.313 0.897*** 0.320
Small firm -0.188** 0.093 -0.087 0.103
Science linkage 0.132 0.087
Technology classes
Application years
Regional dummies
Constant 0.659*** 0.246 0.694*** 0.245 0.723*** 0.276
First stage:
Small firm -0.009 0.046 -0.008 0.047
Science linkage -0.005 0.033
Technology classes
Application years
Regional dummies
Excluded Instruments for subsidy:
g hat 1.001*** 0.156 0.970*** 0.161 0.947*** 0.195
Constant 0.000 0.061 0.007 0.058 0.012 0.061
First Stage Probit:
Academic inventor 1.800*** 0.289 1.820*** 0.297 1.951*** 0.346
Small firm 0.307 0.225 0.081 0.271
Science linkage 0.221 0.254
Technology classes
Application years
Regional dummies
Constant -4.834*** 0.553 -4.843*** 0.483 -5.936*** 0.738
Number of observations
Diagnostic tests and statistics
R-squared (first stage)
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments
F-test of excluded instrument
Underidentification tests:
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic
(3)(1) (2)
IV (wooldridge) IV (wooldridge) IV (wooldridge)
included included included
included included included
included included included
included
included
included included included
included included included
39.44*** 33.96*** 23.61***
included included included
included
included
included
included
41.14*** 36.11*** 23.71***
16.45*** 15.87*** 12.75***
0.301 0.275
0.157 0.149 0.156
0.308
included
included
included
477 477 394
Thus, the conclusion for all three models is that publicly subsidized in-
ventions lead to patents of higher "importance" as measured by the number
of forward citations. The literature on the evaluation of public funding gen-
erally analysis how public subsidies relate to private R&D. The results of this
paper show that public subsidies have a positive impact on the outcome for
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which the project was initially funded. Using patent data solely enables to
improve our understanding of the role of governement-sponsored research at
the project level.
6 Conclusion
Innovation is widely recognized as being a major determinant of economic
growth. Therefore, public initiatives aim at increasing the current level of
innovative activity. In this context, the evaluation of these public policy is
crucial in order to determine which policy tools are the most e¤ective.
Most of the existing empirical literature shows that public subsidies to
R&D are e¤ective in stimulating private R&D (David et al., 2000; Aerts and
Czarnitzki, 2008). However, little is known about the e¤ect of these subsidies
on innovative output. The aim of this paper was to assess whether R&D
subsidies create additional social value by testing the e¤ectiveness of public
support to patented inventions. The results show that subsidized inventions
result in more "important" patents, as measured by the number of forward
citations.
Two important limitations of this analysis (and opportunities for future
work) should be noted. The empirical analysis is conned to inventions that
were successfully patented. The data did not enable me to track inventions
that were subsidized but not patented either because of a contractual agree-
ment between the sponsor and the applicant or because the research was
unsuccessful. At the same time, the data does not allow me to test the
"crowding-out" hypothesis, in other words, this specication does not an-
swer the question as to whether the research would have been carried out
even without the subsidy. However, most of the recent empirical work in this
area concludes that this would not be the case.
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Appendix
In this Appendix I check the robustness of the results with alternative
instruments: two geographical dummies. The rst one equals one if the
invention was carried out in a city with less than 10,000 inhabitants and the
second instrument takes the value one if the invention took place in a rural
area. The choice of these instruments is motivated by the labour and health
literature, in which geographical instruments are typical instruments used to
assess the e¤ect of a treatment on some outcome (see for example Card, 1995,
Mo¢ tt, 1996 or McClellan et al., 1994). In the present case, being an inventor
in a small city or a rural area is assumed to have a negative impact on the
probability to get a R&D subsidy and to be uncorrelated with unobserved
quality of the invention. Governmental agencies delivering R&D subsidies
are usually located in large cities (national or regional capitals), thus the
physical distance between inventors located outside these urban areas and
the relevant governmental agency is supposedly high. Another motivation
for the choice of these instruments is that it is probably more di¢ cult to
simply get access to information on the di¤erent types of fundings when
located in a small city or a rural area. The fact that regional dummies are
included in both stages of the analysis avoids confounding large cities with
innovation clusters that may attract more endowed human capital.
The instruments pass two standard tests, i.e. the test of overidentication,
indicated by the p-value of the Sargan-Hansen test, and the test of excluded
instruments, indicated by the p-value of the F-test. The results show that
the instrumented subsidy dummy and the associated standard errors are
very large in magnitude, which reveals that this identication strategy leads
to less precise results, but conrms the causal e¤ect found in Section 4.
Moreover, the results show that once the subsidy dummy is instrumented
for, the academic dummy is no longer signicant which argues in favor of
using it as an instrument.
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Table 5: Estimation results (4)
Coef. s.d. Coef. s.d. Coef. s.d.
Subsidy 1.716** 0.789 1.934** 0.927 1.82** 0.880
academic inventor -0.543 0.538 -0.488 0.513
Small firm -0.230* 0.125
Technology classes
Application years
Regional dummies
Constant 0.526** 0.268 0.587** 0.270 0.640** 0.262
First stage:
academic inventor 0.513*** 0.096 0.514*** 0.097
Small firm 0.044 0.046
Technology classes
Application years
Regional dummies
Excluded Instruments for subsidy:
City with less than 10,000 inhabitants -0.128*** 0.037 -0.102*** 0.032 -0.105*** 0.032
Rural area -0.099** 0.049 -0.109*** 0.042 -0.112*** 0.042
Constant 0.083 0.071 0.051 0.063 0.042 0.060
Number of observations
F-test of excl. Instruments (p-value)
Sargan-Hansen J test (p-value)
(1) (2)(3)
2SLS 2SLS2SLS
included includedincluded
included includedincluded
included includedincluded
included includedincluded
included includedincluded
included includedincluded
460 460469
0.002
0.371
0.002
0.343
0.002
0.223
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